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Abstract—As item trading becomes more popular, users can
change their game items or money into real money more easily.
At the same time, hackers turn their eyes on stealing other users
game items or money because it is much easier to earn money
than traditional gold-farming by running game bots. Game
companies provide various security measures to block account-
theft attempts, but many security measures on the user-side are
disregarded by users because of lack of usability. In this study,
we propose a server-side account theft detection system base on
action sequence analysis to protect game users from malicious
hackers. We tested this system in the real Massively Multiplayer
Online Role Playing Game (MMORPG). By analyzing users full
game play log, our system can find the particular action sequences
of hackers with high accuracy. Also, we can trace where the
victim accounts stolen money goes.
Index Terms—Account theft, User behavior analysis, Sequence
analysis, MMORPG
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet has increasingly become a big part of
people’s daily life. Also, real economy and virtual economy
combines fast then the border between real and virtual world
becomes blur. Hackers develop various attack tactics to take
advantage of the online world; Account theft is one of the
frequent attacks. If a hacker’s can steal a user’s authentication
information (e.g. ID and password), then he can gain personal
information and cyber assets possessed by the user. From
this point of view, hackers turn their eyes on online game
companies and game money exchange sites (e.g. ItemBay1 and
ItemMania2), because those sites’ security level is relatively
lower than government or banking sites. Also, their platform
make it easy for users to turn their items into cash. For
example, in case of Blizzard, a game producer of Overwatch
and World of Warcraft, was hacked in 2012; Unfortunately,
Blizzard users’ information was leaked [1]. In case of Steam,
a famous game delivery platform, reported that almost 77,000
users’ information is illegally leaked every month [2].
To respond this kind of attack, many game companies
are providing various security measure to protect users from
account theft attacks. Typical examples are OTP (One Time
Password) for strong authentication, machine ID inspection for
detecting a login from unusual machines, Antivirus programs
1http://www.itembay.com
2http://www.itemmania.com, ItemBay and ItemMania raise a profit of 40
million dollars out of commission fees for the trades annually.
to detect keylogger or password stealer program. Even though
many game providers offer a variety of services to prevent
account theft for free, but most of them are not widely
used because of its inconvenience. For example, many game
companies provide OTP authentication software for PC or
mobile, but users disregard this security protection measure,
because they do not want to install additional authenticator
program on their devices. Figure 1 shows the screenshot of
the mobile OTP apps provided by Blizzard and Valve.
Fig. 1: Blizzard and Valve’s mobile authentication app.
In this paper, we analyzed the action sequences of the
account thieves and proposed a model to detect account thieves
based on the analysis results. The proposed detection model
is useful in detecting the theft of users even if the users do
not perform security measures at the user-side. We analyzed
transaction networks of the account thieves and analyzed
their transaction characteristics and analyzed whether they are
related to game bots.
A. Contributions
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed account theft
detection method, we use the ground truth data from one of
the largest MMORPGs, Aion3, developed by NCSoft. The key
contributions of this study are as follows:
• We conducted real MMORPG dataset analysis to detect
hacker’s behaviors. To this end, we did action sequence
3http://na.aiononline.com/en/
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analysis method to detect an account theft attempt in
MMORPG. Our proposed method can detect account
theft with high accuracy.
• We reveal account thefts are highly correlated with
game bots and GFG; The victimized accounts’ money
transfered to GFG’s accounts.
B. Ethical Considerations
We note that all collected log data for this study satisfy
related ethical review. Before installation, all game users
were asked to acknowledge a consent form under the End
User License Agreement (EULA) and domestic laws, which
informed them that their data might be used in improving the
quality of the installed game. Anonymous data samples were
collected confidentially only for the purposes of conducting
statistical analyses.
C. Organization
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In §II, we
introduce terminologies and background knowledge used in
this paper. In §III, we review related works. In §IV, we propose
a method to detect account theft based on action sequence
analysis. We demonstrate the overall detection process and
evaluate the performance of the proposed method. Also, we
reveal the trace result by analyzing item trade network. Finally,
we summarize our findings and conclude in §V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Terminology
• Account theft, Account thief and victim account. Ac-
count theft is a criminal activity to steal a user’s account
(ID and password) for abusable purposes. Account thief
and victim account is an attacker and victim in the course
of account theft, respectively.
• Game Bot. Game bot is an AI program designed to
play a game automatically without human’s control. This
program discourages normal users of the program to play
a game since they feel deprived of their opportunities to
win to their counterparts using the program.
• GFG (Gold Farming Group). GFG is an industrialized
group which run lots of game bot to earn cyber money or
item efficiently. Usually, GFG run game bots composed
of three sub-groups: gold-farmer group to collect game
items, merchant group to turn them into cash and banker
group to keep the items-turned game money.
• RMT (Real Money Trading). RMT is an activity of
trading cyber item or money for real money. By doing
RMT, users can gain high-value game asset by paying
real money. Therefore, it is possible to reach the highest
level fast with less efforts in game.
• Game log. Game server generates various types of log at
the server-side in order to record users’ in-game activities.
In general, this log can be used for bug trace, user
behavior analysis, and game bot detection. Usually, game
log includes account ID, event or action ID, time stamp,
and context-related information.
Traditionally, game bots run by GFGs and RMT are the
most serious problems in online game. Because it can destroy
the fair-play rules of game. Even worse, they can eventually
lead the collapse of economic balance in game. Therefore,
most game companies make efforts to detect and block game
bots and RMT [5].
III. RELATED WORK
Many researches conducted on account theft detection meth-
ods by gathering additional information at the client-side (e.g.
MAC address for machine ID detection, Antivirus program
for detecting keylogger programs), or data mining techniques
at the server-side. To provide better usability to users, client-
side account theft detection is not well used today. In case
of data mining approach at the server-side, most frequently
method used features are game user’s login time, IP address,
MAC address and movement pattern. Chen and Hong [3]
proposes a model to detect the theft by using Kullback-Leibler
Divergence (KLD) on a pattern of the playing time in an
MMORPG. Oh et al. [7] applies a statistical technique to
data, like experience level, trade and playing time to come
up with a model to detect. Woo et al. [8] classified account
theft process into exploration, monetization and theft. They
used decision tree for classification of account theft. Choi
et al.[4] classified account theft type into three: “quick in-
and-out”, “cautious” and “bold”. Based on their three major
account theft scenario, they verified the feasibility by using
the neural network. They used game related features such as
experience level, login time, and play duration. However, this
study has several limitations as follows their proposed method
showed high accuracy. However, once account theft pattern
has changed, they need to train a neural network again. Lee et
al. [6] used action sequence analysis extracted from the game
action logs in order to detect game BOT users.
Most of the studies on account theft mainly focused on
developing detection methods, but they used simulation data
not real dataset. Also, their training dataset used small number
of samples collected in a short term period. In our study, we
conduct the action sequence analysis to create a detection
model with real data collected in a long term period. Also,
with our best knowledge, our study is the only study which
traces the full money trail of the victim accounts. As a result,
we can unveil where the stolen money goes and who are the
wire-puller behind the scene.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we propose a method to detect account theft.
Also, we did postmortem analysis on the victim accounts.
Figure 2 shows the overall process of the proposed method.
A. Dataset
We used full logs collected from one of the Aion servers
from June 25th to July 4th in 2010. In total, there were 23
confirmed account theft cases (i.e. ground-truth data). During
this period, 1.1 cases occurred on average; and the peak
number of case was 11 cases in the same day. Most of
Fig. 2: Overall process of the proposed methodology
account theft cases occurred in a row. We built the blacklist by
extracting IP addresses used by victim accounts and then we
extracted all game logs from the server related to the users
who were connected from the blacklist IP addresses at the
same date when the accounts theft occurred. In total, there
were 82 times of login and logout events from the 9 suspicious
IP addresses.
To reduce the size of logs, we excluded 18 types of logs
which were automatically generated by game system. The
excluded logs include less informative data such as game
maintenance notice. Finally, we carefully chose 41 types of
logs for the analysis such as combat, trade, movement and
hunting. Absolutely, the login and logout related logs were
fully included to avoid information loss.
1) Ground truth: In many previous studies, some re-
searchers used data sets generated artificially by hired players
and hacking programs. Other researches used a list of accounts
that other players reported them as suspicious players. It may
generate false positive errors. The ground truth data (detected
bot users, GFGs, and account theft cases) used in this paper
is confirmed list by NCSoft. These ground truth data was
carefully collected by professional monitoring persons called
as GMs (Game Masters) who can secretly monitor the game
world and detect malicious users. Also, all detected malicious
users can raise a petition to appeal they are innocent but the
detected users did not claim.
B. Analysis of Account Thieves’ Behavior
In order to understand the behaviors of account thieves, 11
different types of actions are reviewed: battle, skill, friendship,
trade, item production, item sale, item etc. (miscellaneous item
related events), game money, movement, user information and
etc. Figure 3 shows the comparison of action ratio between
normal users and victim accounts (played by account thieves)
for each type of action. Victim accounts have smaller number
of friendship or battle related actions;but, they have higher
number of trade and item related activities than normal users.
User_info.
Trade
Skill
Movement
Item Sale
Item Production
Item Etc.
Game Money
Friendship
Etc.
Battle
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
ratio
Normal User
Account Theft
Fig. 3: Action Ratio by Normal Users and Account thieves
We also analyzed the expenditure ratio of the victim ac-
counts in a week-long basis. The expenditure ratio is defined
as a ratio of spent money and possessed money per day. The
expenditure ratio is calculated as shown in Equation (1) below.
Daily usedmoney
Amountofmoney at the beginning + Daily usedmoney
(1)
Figure 4 indicates that most of the expenditure ratio shows
the ranges around 20% to 25% during the first-six days when
no account theft occurred. It goes up to 70% on the day when
account theft occurred. In this box-plot, Red ‘diamond’ means
an average value, ‘straight line’ means a median value and
‘box’ means an expenditure ratio. We can find the account
thieves main purpose is to steal game money or items from
victim accounts; then, they sell the stolen items in order to gain
real money. Therefore, the victim accounts played by account
thieves show higher expenditure ratio than normal users.
Through the comparative analysis of action types and ex-
penditure ratio, we can find the account thieves main purpose.
Based on this findings, we perform action sequence analysis to
find common action sequences (that can be used as a detection
signature) and visualize account thieves’ action pattern more
clearly.
C. Action Sequence Analysis of Account Thieves’
Table I shows the mapping for the action sequence analysis.
First, we categorize all action behaviors into 11 categories.
Then, we mapped 11 different action categories with an
alphabet character from ‘A’ to ‘K’. Each category includes the
related actions as follows: For example, ‘User information’
includes the actions related to user’s level, playtime, and
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Fig. 4: The weekly expenditure ratio of the victims (account
theft occurred in the day 7 in X-axis.)
TABLE I: Action categories and their mapped alphabet char-
acters for the sequence analysis
Category character Category character
Login A Item Production G
Logout B Item Purchase H
User Information C Item Sale I
Movement D Trade J
Decrease of
Game Money
E Etc. K
Increase of
Game Money
F - -
experience point. ‘Movement’ includes all movement related
actions such as teleport, movement, or flight. ‘Item Purchase’
and ‘Item Sale’ include the events when an item is purchased
or sold through an NPC shop or a user’s own shop. ‘Trade’
includes all events when a user exchanges or transfers items
or money.
For the detected 82 times of login and logout events, we
analyzed the playing time distribution for each login case.
Table II shows a ratio of game-playing time for each login
session. We categorized the game-playing time into 4 types.
It indicates that 88% of victim accounts (Type 1, 2 and 3) are
abused within 10 minutes. That means account thieves play
the victim account within 10 minutes after login. (Thus, they
can steal items and sell them within 10 minutes.) In order to
TABLE II: A ratio of the account thieves’ playing times
Type Count Ratio Note
1 Less than 1
minutes
32 39%
2 Less than 5
minutes
33 40%
3 Less than 10
minutes
7 7%
4 More than
10 minutes
10 10% Within an hour: 8
More than an hour: 2
understand what actions takes place for each type, the account
thief’s action sequences are visualized in a temporal view.
Figure 5 shows an action sequence graph of victim accounts
by type. We extract and display the common action sequences
commonly existed in all user’s action sequences for each type.
• Type 1 ‘Type 1’ victims in Table II show that Login (A)
and Logout (B) actions are repeated. It seems automated
and repeated procedures by the account thieves to check
whether the account’s original user can be aware of
their illegal login actions. Because many modern online
games provide notification when suspicious login events
occurred. When account thieves confirm that there are
no responsive checking events by account’s original user,
then they proceed to steal victim’s possessions. We can
discover the action sequences (G)-(G)-(G)-(B) are follow-
ing. It means account thieves utilized the victim’s money
to produce items (i.e., pink colored (G)) and then just did
logout to check whether they are detected or not.
• Type 2 ‘Type 2’ victims shows that items are sold by
account thieves; We can find ‘Type 2’ victims commonly
have the action sequences of (G)-(G)-(G)-(I)-(I)-(I)-(E).
That means account thieves produce items then sell them
and use the earned money. Yellow colored (I) means ‘Item
sale’, blue colored (E) means ‘Decrease of Game Money’
as defined in Table I.
• Type 3 and 4 ‘Type 3 and 4’ victims basically repeat the
common action sequences of Type 2 victim. Then, they
additionally do ‘Trade’. (Red colored (J) means ‘Trade’.)
To summarize, once account thieves take control of the
victim account securely, they repeatedly produce item by
using victim’s possessions and sell or trade the produced
items to gain money. That’s the reason why Type 3 and
4 victims repeatedly have sequences composed of I and
E.
D. Experiments and Evaluations
On the result of the sequence analysis, some features are
selected with unnecessary logs taken off. The selections are
shown in the Table III. 95% of all victim accounts includes
higher than 40 in level (the highest level was 50 when the
dataset was built). 88% of users starts playing a game within
10 minutes. All accounts have zero in experience level beside
one. (supposed that they are all used for profiteering activities,
not for anything else. So, they might have 0 in experience point
with the one account being used for simple item collection).
Logs to movements are included since stolen items, or game
money would be passed on to somewhere. A game money
decreases immediately after it increases as part of the analyzed
sequence. So, logs to the increase or decrease are included
as well. Logs related to item production are one of the
considerations to be selected since it is an important step in
the account thieves’ activities for undue profits, and item sale
and trade included.
As the number of account theft cases was noticeably smaller
than normal users, this study constructed learning data after
executing under-sampling technique of normal data and trained
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
A  Login
B  Logout
C  User information query 
D  Movement
E   Decrease of game money
F  Increase of game money
G  Item production
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Fig. 5: Common action sequence of victim accounts
TABLE III: Selected features for detecting account thieves
Category Feature
User Information Level, Playtime, Experience point
Movement Number of movements
Game Money
Decrease the number of game money, Decre-
ment of game money, Increase the number of
game money, Increment of game money
Item Production
Gain, Collection, Production, Item installation,
Item non-installation, Extraction, Number of ex-
tract
Item Sale NPC shop, User shop, sales agency
Item Trade Trade, move an item from a location to another
them using 10-folds cross-validation method. Three data min-
ing methods are used as well: Multilayer Perceptron (MLP),
Logistic and Random Forest. MLP is a method to construct
weights on the node networked with a neural algorithm and
changeable links and use repetitive learning to create a model.
As one of regression analysis, Logistic can help better interpret
and predict a model as it selects necessary variables. Random
Forest learns multiple decision tree models in the process of
training and then comprehensively looks at various results to
sort them out.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(2)
(where, TP: True Positive, TN: True Negative, FP: False Positive, and FN: False Negative)
TABLE IV: Performance of Account Theft Detection System
(dataset in 2010)
MLP Logistic Random Forest
Precision 0.676 0.710 0.844
Recall 0.665 0.682 0.835
Accuracy 66% 68% 84%
This paper used three kinds of evaluation index (Precision,
Recall, and Accuracy), and the definition of the three kinds of
the index is shown in Equation (2). Precision means the ratio to
whether detected results are actually account theft, and Recall
is the ratio showing how much actual account theft is detected
through the detection model. Accuracy is the index about how
accurately the proposed model to all users predicted.
Table IV shows the results after those three methods used,
with Random Forest performing the best at 84%. Table V
shows results from Random Forest on each type. Except for
Type 2, all indicates higher than 0.9. In the case of Type 1 with
less than 1 minute, once the type is detected, any attempts to
take game money or an item can be preventable since the type
can be interpreted as a preceding act for the actual purpose.
The study includes an extra experiment with new Aion
dataset from August 17th to 19th in 2015. The total number
of login and logout is 42. The result follows as in Table VI.
As a result, it shows better in accuracy than that of the
dataset in 2015, with all higher than 80%. Random Forest is
set at 88%, 4% higher than that of the dataset in 2010. The
findings help construe that the account theft has changed their
TABLE V: Performance of Random Forest For Each Type
Type Precision Recall Accuracy
Type1 0.914 0.914 97%
Type2 0.706 0.75 75%
Type3 1 0.714 71%
Type4 1 0.545 63%
TABLE VI: Performance of Account Theft Detection System
(new Aion dataset in 2015)
MLP Logistic Random Forest
Precision 0.823 0.822 0.861
Recall 0.838 0.81 0.881
Accuracy 84% 81% 88%
patterns to the one as found in the sequence suggested in this
study than before.
The proposed detection model can discover victim accounts
successfully.
E. Analysis of Account Thieves’ Trade Networks
In general, the ‘trade’ in an online game means an activity
to either exchange an item between users or pay or receive
game money for the exchange. But, the network for trade by
the account thieves is found to include trades where an item
is only given without anything paid for it. Unlike it, 19% of
trades among general users includes the ones with money paid
for exchange with the rest 81% not paying for the exchange.
But, as said, account thieves do not get paid for exchange
100%.
Two group are set in this study: first is “account theft group”
trading through IP addresses on a blacklist and second is
“suspicious group” trading not through them. The total number
of trades with using victim accounts is 55, with 43 by the first
group and 12 by the second group. Common trade patterns on
the abused accounts are shown in Figure 6. The numbers in
circles mean the id of users playing a game while the other
numbers on each line indicate dates, locations of trade (Zone
information in the game map), and number of trade.
Fig. 6: Patterns for trades by the abusers
Fig. 7: Trade network of the account theft group
The victim accounts of U17 to 20 are used to send items
or game money to another victim accounts of U21 at C in
29th. Then, U21 comes to D to give them to U34 and U35.
This pattern is similar to 3 depth of GFG. This is because
U21 stores all those stolen items or game money to a certain
account and plays a role as a merchant tossing them to another
account. U17 to 20 work as a gold-farmer collecting them.
Lastly, U34 and U35 are a bank group. In order to see if there
is any correlation with game bots, the study also traces any
usage of the victim accounts and game bots. A trace of having
used a game bot is found on all those accounts, indicating
that it would be possible for the program to work to steel user
information.
Figure 7 shows the trade network of the account theft
group. As explained above, specific characteristics of the trade
network on the abused accounts can be found in ‘(d)’, ‘(e)’
and ‘(f)’. In this diagram, users on the right give items or game
money to their counterparts on the left for nothing. The trade
pattern goes on as they move from a place to another to send
them to their final destination. Locations used for this kind
of trades are fairly limited. That means, they prefer secluded
places for the trades. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ are used, with
‘A’ and ‘B’ being used to receive them coming from victim
accounts and ‘B’ and ‘D’ being used to transfer them.
Figure 8 shows the trade network of the suspicious group.
The trades with the account theft group in different locations
are labeled as “Group A”. Trades with the account theft group
at least one time in the same locations are labeled as “Group
B”. The “Group A” can be understood as a trade among
general users since blacklisted IP addresses are not used, and
it does not happen in the locations used by the account theft
group. In the case of ‘(e)’ and ‘(f)’ in the “Group B”, it is
believed that they have nothing to do with the abused accounts
since original users trade for a week through IP addresses as
they have. ‘(g)’ is conceived to be used by the account theft
group as a new IP address not used for a week is used and
the trade happens in the location, ‘D’ where the group trades.
In other words, the Figure 6 puts together ‘(d)’ of the Figure
7 and ‘(g)’ of the Figure 8 as trade connections with U21 at
its center.
Fig. 8: Trade network of the suspicious group
This study finds that the account theft collects items or
game money by using victim accounts and move them to
somewhere for final delivery.
V. CONCLUSION
Account theft is the most serious threat which can damage
to both game companies and game users. In this study, we pro-
pose the method to reveal account thieve’ pattern through data
mining and action sequence analysis. The proposed detection
method shows a higher detection rate over ‘less than 1-minute’
type which was classified as the ‘prelude’ acts before the actual
account theft proceed. By using this pattern, game companies
can pro-actively detect and stop the account theft attempts.
Also, we conduct trade network analysis to reveal the victims
accounts stolen by account thieves are correlated with GFGs.
In the future, we will adopt more features to increase the
accuracy. We will also consider to apply this model to another
MMORPG. We believe our method can apply to many online
games which have detailed game logs including transactions
and logon events.
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